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Space, place, landscape and perception: phenomenological perspectives

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Chapter 1

Space, Place, Landscape and Perception: Phenomenological Perspectives

Introduction: Spatial Science to Humanized Space

During the past thirty years a striking series of parallels and convergences have taken place in human geography and archaeology. Until the 1960s both disciplines were largely empiricist in outlook and concerned with distinctiveness and difference in various ways. Human geography was dominated by the study of regions at various spatial scales – North America, Africa, Asia, regions of Britain or Canada, etc., treated in a holistic manner. The resulting syntheses tended to start by discussing geology, climate and soils and ended by considering such matters as welfare provision and political systems. This was the geographical equivalent of the anthropological monograph in which ‘everything’ was brought together into a whole. In a similar way archaeology was concerned with space-time systematics and the ordering of artefacts and other evidence into cultural units within a delimited territorial area with a putative ethnic significance.

The ‘revolutions’ of the ‘new’ geography and the ‘new’ archaeology consigned such a perspective to an unenlightened Dark Age of superstition and misunderstanding. Replacing it all was the white heat of positivism coupled with functionalism, in which a notion of geography as spatial science and archaeology as a science of the past were borne. The history of and the subsequent disillusionment with this approach are well known, and there is no need to rehearse them here in any detail.

As a component of the retheorization of human geography from the 1970s onwards and in archaeology during the 1980s the usefulness of a ‘scientific’ conception of space abstracted from human affairs has systematically been called into question (e.g. Harvey 1973; Relph 1976; Gregory 1978; Gregory and Urry 1985;

Soja 1989; Hodder 1982a,b, 1986, 1987, 1992; Miller and Tilley 1984; Shanks and Tilley 1987a,b, 1989; Bender 1992, 1993; Tilley 1994). The major differences between a 'scientific' or abstract and a 'humanized' or meaning-laden space can be summarized as follows:

container	medium
decentred	centred
geometry	context
surfaces	densities
universal	specific
objective	subjective
substantial	relational
totalized	detotalized
external	internal
system	strategy
neutral	empowered
coherence	contradiction
atemporal	temporal
ABSTRACT SPACE	HUMAN SPACE
↙ ↘	
materialist, rational	idealist, irrational

The list might be considerably extended, or the couplets abbreviated, since they clearly overlap. I have added a cross-over between the lists of terms at the bottom in order to indicate that the approach which has usually been claimed as the hallmark of an objective, rational and materialist approach to space (the left-hand column) now appears, in view of the weight of contemporary arguments, as a form of irrational idealism and vice versa.

It is from the general perspective of the terms listed in the right-hand column that this book both takes its starting-point and attempts to develop in relation to a consideration of landscape. While not wishing to dwell too much here on the antagonistic history of past debates it seems necessary to explain and unpack the columns of oppositions as a background to the rest of the book.

New geography and new archaeology considered space as an abstract dimension or container in which human activities and events took place. The implication of this perspective was that activity and event and space were conceptually and physically separate from each other and only contingently related. Such a view of space decentred it from agency and meaning. It was something that could be objectively measured in terms of an abstracted geometry of scale. Space was quite literally a nothingness, a simple surface for action, lacking depth. This space was universal, everywhere and anywhere the same, and had cross-cultural impact on people and society. People had to move across this space, and movement through it, for example, created 'friction' limiting human potentialities. The effects of distance and the varying potentialities of site locations could be objectively specified on one and the same spatial scale of measurement. Space as container, surface and volume was substantial inasmuch as it existed in itself and for itself, external to and indifferent to human affairs. The neutrality of this space resulted in its being divorced from any consideration of structures of power and domination. A space divorced from humanity and society provided a coherent and unitary backdrop for any analysis, since it was always the same. The space of the palaeolithic was the same as the space of late capitalism, that of Vancouver identical to that of Canberra. As a dimension in which human action took place it was directly equivalent to and separate from time, the second primary and abstracted scale according to which societal change could be documented and 'measured'.

The attraction of this perspective was, no doubt, its purity and simplicity and the potential it offered for comparative studies of the organization of artefacts, sites, populations, and flows of information and exchange across regions and landscapes. All could be objectively plotted on maps, distances measured and expressed according to the same rigorous and quantitative scale.

Quantification, mathematization and computer modelling seemingly offered unlimited potential for unravelling the spatial fix of human affairs. Burning issues of the day in geography and archaeology became what sampling fractions to use, how to construct appropriate boundaries for a nearest-neighbour analysis, what were the best statistics to use and the development of alternative methodologies for measuring and describing the abstract geometry of space. Lurking beneath the distribution of the dots on a map was a spatial process and causality to be discovered.

The linkages between new geography and new archaeology were quite explicit. Clarke's *Models in Archaeology* (1972) was itself modelled on Chorley and Haggett's *Models in Geography* (1967). Harvey's *Explanation in Geography* (1969) found its archaeological counterpart in *Explanation in Archaeology* (Watson *et al.* 1971). Clarke (1972) identified a 'geographical paradigm' to archaeological research which was simply the extension of the spatial methodology of the new geography to archaeological evidence, while Renfrew (1969) predicted that the texts of new geographers would provide source books in methods for future generations of archaeologists.

Accordingly 'new' geography was systematically used to provide the basis for a mathematical spatial archaeology (Hodder and Orton 1976; Clarke 1977). The traditional archaeological distribution map of sites and artefacts now became clothed with Thiessen polygons, site catchments, regression lines, trend surfaces and gravity models, all reflecting in various ways the 'friction' and impact of space on human affairs (for reviews see Goudie 1987; Wagstaff 1987a).

The alternative view starts from regarding space as a medium rather than a container for action, something that is involved in action and cannot be divorced from it. As such, space does not and cannot exist apart from the events and activities within which it is implicated. Space is socially produced, and different societies, groups and individuals act out their lives in different spaces. Space in itself no longer becomes a meaningful term. There is no space, only spaces. These spaces, as social productions, are always centred in relation to human agency and are amenable to reproduction or change because their constitution takes place as part of the day-to-day *praxis* or practical activity of individuals and groups in the world. They are meaningfully constituted in relation to human agency and activity. A humanized space forms both the medium and outcome of action, both constraining and enabling it. A centred and meaningful space involves specific sets of linkages between the physical space of the non-humanly created world, somatic states of the body, the mental space of cognition and representation and the space of movement, encounter and interaction between persons and between persons and the human and non-human environment. Socially produced space combines the cognitive, the physical and the emotional into something that may be reproduced but is always open to transformation and change. A social space, rather

than being uniform and forever the same, is constituted by differential densities of human experience, attachment and involvement. It is above all contextually constituted, providing particular settings for involvement and the creation of meanings. The specificity of place is an essential element in understanding its significance. It follows that the meanings of space always involve a subjective dimension and cannot be understood apart from the symbolically constructed lifeworlds of social actors. Space has no substantial essence in itself, but only has a relational significance, created through relations between peoples and places. Space becomes detotalized by virtue of its relational construction and because, being differentially understood and produced by different individuals, collectivities and societies, it can have no universal essence. What space is depends on who is experiencing it and how. Spatial experience is not innocent and neutral, but invested with power relating to age, gender, social position and relationships with others. Because space is differentially understood and experienced it forms a contradictory and conflict-ridden medium through which individuals act and are acted upon. The experience of space is always shot through with temporalities, as spaces are always created, reproduced and transformed in relation to previously constructed spaces provided and established from the past. Spaces are intimately related to the formation of biographies and social relationships.

Such a notion of space is undoubtedly complex. There is and can be no clear-cut methodology arising from it to provide a concise guide to empirical research. The approach requires, rather, a continuous dialectic between ideas and empirical data. From this perspective, the intimate connection of space with the social, with the formation of biographies, with action, event, power, context and subjectivity, materializes or concretizes its specificity and impact in the social world. We move from the irrational abstracted idealism of a geometrical universal space to an ontological grounding of space in the differential structuring of human experience and action in the world: a perspective which now requires examination in more detail.

A Phenomenological Perspective

The key issue in any phenomenological approach is the manner in which people experience and understand the world.

Phenomenology involves the understanding and description of things as they are experienced by a subject. It is about the relationship between Being and Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world resides in a process of objectification in which people objectify the world by setting themselves apart from it. This results in the creation of a gap, a distance in space. To be human is both to create this distance between the self and that which is beyond and to attempt to bridge this distance through a variety of means – through perception (seeing, hearing, touching), bodily actions and movements, and intentionality, emotion and awareness residing in systems of belief and decision-making, remembrance and evaluation.

Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in *simple oneness* into things, ordered the house. It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and which, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the 'tree of the dead' – for that is what they call a coffin there: the *Totenbaum* – and in this way it is designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse (Heidegger 1972: 338).

The fact is that if we want to describe it, we must say that my experience breaks forth into things and transcends itself in them, because it always comes into being within the framework of a certain setting in relation to the world which is the definition of my body ... Any perception of a thing, a shape or a size as real, any perceptual constancy refers back to the positing of a world and of a system of experience in which my body is inescapably linked with phenomena. But the system of experience is not arrayed before me as if I were God, it is lived by me from a certain point of view; I am not the spectator, I am involved, and it is my involvement in a point of view which makes possible both the finiteness of my perception and its opening out upon the complete world as a horizon of every perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 303–4).

I have let Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty set the scene. From rather different phenomenological perspectives, they have both stressed important ontological characteristics of the relationship between inhabited space and social Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger 'spaces receive their essential being from locations and not from "space"' (1972: 332). A mathematical 'space' of measurement contains no spaces, places or locations, for it is not humanized. Spaces open up by virtue of the *dwelling* of humanity or the *staying with things* that cannot be separated: the earth, the sky and the constellations, the divinities, birth and death. Space is that something for which room is made. Building produces things as locations and building and thinking both belong to dwelling. Heidegger proposes a *topological* model for thinking about the relationship between people and the landscape as a matter of the 'thereness' of the self-disclosure of Being in and of the world. Cognition is not opposed to reality, but is wholly given over in the total social fact of dwelling, serving to link place, praxis, cosmology and nurture.

If 'dwelling', in Heideggerian terms, forms a primordial part of that which it is to be human, this necessarily requires a consideration of the body as the privileged vantage point from which the world is apprehended. The kinetic activities of human beings orientate apprehension of the landscape and create it as human. Space is existential, and existence is spatial in that it opens onto an 'outside', a series of reference points (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 293). Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, attempts to chart a middle course between an empiricist objectivism and a cognitive idealism. With empiricist objectivism, the perception of space and the environment, like everything else, is an event in nature. Perception is the causal physical or chemical action of a thing on an organ which sensation registers. Everything takes place in a world of pure objectivity, and there is no *subject* who perceives. Conversely, a cognitive idealism posits an absolute subjectivity involving a transcendental Ego who is the subject of experience. In a relation of pure interiority the objective world exists only in relation to a consciousness which projects that world before itself. For Merleau-Ponty the problem of both of these positions is that they systematically evade the problem of the phenomenon of perception, empiricism because it makes an object of the subject, cognitive idealism because it reduces the perception of the object to an operation of thought (*ibid.*: 39). Merleau-Ponty argues that

the human body provides the fundamental mediation point between thought and the world. The world and the subject reflect and flow into each other through the body that provides the living bond with the world. Notions of 'object' and 'subject', 'nature' and 'consciousness' are dialectically related moments of a totality which is constituted through the Being of the body in the world. The body constitutes a way of relating to, perceiving and understanding the world. It is the manner in which a subjective attitude comes to both know and express itself. Perceptual consciousness is not just a matter of thought about the world, but stems from bodily presence and bodily orientation in relation to it, bodily awareness: 'far from my body's being for me no more than a fragment of space, there would be no space at all for me if I had no body' (ibid.: 102).

While 'dwelling' occurs in different varieties and textures of humanly created space, this social existence is, of course, rooted in natural and non-humanly created environments. The concept of dwelling, with its fourfold ontological implications as pointed out by Heidegger, the human body as a focus for the perception of a humanized world, and the groundedness of social Being in that which is not humanly created constitute the fundamental presuppositions for beginning to think about the relationship between people and landscape in a fresh manner. Subjectivity and objectivity connect in a dialectic producing a *place* for Being in which the topography and physiography of the land and thought remain distinct but play into each other as an 'intelligible landscape', a spatialization of Being, which I will now examine in a less abstract manner.

Space and Place

If space allows movement, place is pause (Taun 1977: 6).

The relationship between space and place has been discussed and theorized from one particular perspective within a phenomenological 'school' of geographical research (Taun 1974, 1975, 1977; Pickles 1985; Relph 1976; Buttimer and Seamon 1980; Seamon and Mugerauer 1989). The key concern in this approach is the manner in which places *constitute* space as centres of human meaning, their singularity being manifested and expressed in the

day-to-day experiences and consciousness of people within particular lifeworlds. Such an approach starts from an initial presupposition claiming the wholeness and indivisibility of a human experience of place, and that meaning, defined in terms of structures of intentionality, is central to any understanding of place. Knowledge of place stems from human experiences, feeling and thought. Space is a far more abstract construct than place. It provides a situational context for places, but derives its meanings from particular places (Relph 1976: 8). Without places there can be no spaces, and the former have primary ontological significance as centres of bodily activity, human significance and emotional attachment. The meaning of place is grounded in existential or lived consciousness of it. It follows that the limits of place are grounded in the limits of human consciousness. Places are as diffuse and differentiated as the range of identities and significances accorded to them. People are immersed in a world of places which the geographical imagination aims to understand and recover – places as contexts for human experience, constructed in movement, memory, encounter and association. There may be a strong affection for place (topophilia) or aversion (topophobia), but places are always far more than points or locations, because they have distinctive meanings and values for persons. Personal and cultural identity is bound up with place; a topographical analysis is one exploring the creation of self-identity through place. Geographical experience begins in places, reaches out to others through spaces, and creates landscapes or regions for human existence.

Attempts have been made in the literature to generalize the specificity of place by erecting typologies of particular kinds of spaces through which the identities of place are constructed. Such classifications can only act as heuristic devices, since it can be argued that places, by their very nature, contain sedimented meanings which resist such boxing and bracketing of their natures and significance. The following forms of space might be identified:

1. Somatic space
2. Perceptual space
3. Existential space
4. Architectural space
5. Cognitive space

Somatic space is a space of habitual and unselfconscious action. It is the space of sensory experience and bodily movement. An understanding of this space takes as its starting-point the upright human body looking out on the world. Space opens out before the body and is differentiable in terms of front/back; left/right; vertical/horizontal; top/bottom; within reach/beyond reach; within hearing/beyond hearing; within sight/beyond sight; here/there polarities (Relph 1976: 9; Taun 1977: 35–50). The very physicality of the body imposes a schema on space through which it may be experienced and understood. An experience of space is grounded in the body itself; its capacities and potentialities for movement. Through time–space routines of movement a person knows where she or he is in relation to familiar places and objects and ‘how to go on’ in the world. Lived body-space incorporates not only habituated movement in general but also modes of walking, turning, reaching in performing particular acts: body-ballets (Seamon 1979, 1980).

Perceptual space is the egocentric space perceived and encountered by individuals in their daily practices. The centre of such a space is grounded in individual perception of distances and directions, natural objects and cultural creations. This space is always relative and qualitative. Distance and direction are perceived as near or far, this way or that way, moving along one track or another. A perceptual space is one that links patterns of individual intentionality to bodily movement and perception. It is a space of personality, of encounter and emotional attachment. It is the constructed life-space of the individual, involving feelings and memories giving rise to a sense of awe, emotion, wonder or anguish in spatial encounters. Such a space may as often as not be felt rather than verbalized. It creates personal significances for an individual in his or her bodily routines – places remembered and places of affective importance.

Perceptual space is intricately interlinked with existential space or the lived space as it is constructed in the concrete experiences of individuals socialized within a group. The meanings of existential space transcend the individual and form a grounding for perceptual space rather than being some kind of summation of individualized perception. Existential space is in a constant process of production and reproduction through the movements and activities of members of a group. It is a mobile rather than a passive space for experience. It is experienced and created

through life-activity, a sacred, symbolic and mythic space replete with social meanings wrapped around buildings, objects and features of the local topography, providing reference points and planes of emotional orientation for human attachment and involvement. Places in existential space are foci for the production of meaning, intention and purpose of societal significance. Boundaries are of major significance in structuring existential space both in and between places and regions. Boundaries are to do with creating distinctions and marking out social oppositions, mapping social and cultural difference and Otherness. The presence of boundaries, obvious natural prototypes being river courses, mountain chains, or rock outcrops, and the coast, may be of major significance in delimiting territories, the choice of locales and the networking of paths through a landscape.

Architectural space only makes sense in relation to pragmatic, perceptual and existential space, but involves a deliberate attempt to create and bound space, create an inside, an outside, a way around, a channel for movement. Architecture is the deliberate creation of space made tangible, visible and sensible. This is why buildings play a fundamental role in the creation and recreation, production and reproduction of existential space and have profound structuring effects on perceptual space.

Finally, cognitive space provides a basis for reflection and theorization with regard to understanding the others. It is the ‘space’ of this discussion and analysis.

Space can only exist as a set of relations between things or places. In this sense there is no space that is not relational. Space is created by social relations, natural and cultural objects. It is a production, an achievement, rather than an autonomous reality in which things or people are located or ‘found’. Having been constituted by things and places spatial relations affect the way in which they relate. In other words, there is a sociospatial dialectic at work – space is both constituted and constitutive.

Locales, Social Action

Places may, of course, be experienced and conceptualized at any number of spatial levels, from personal space to community space to regional space and so on. Places overlap according to scales of action, interest, movement and concern. Place is an

irreducible part of human experience, a person is 'in place' just as much as she or he is 'in culture'. Place is about situatedness in relation to identity and action. In this sense place is context, and there can be no non-contextual definition of context or place. The specificity of space always has to be understood from a particular viewpoint.

In small-scale non-Western societies place, defined as a centre for action, intention and meaningful concern, can be best considered in terms of locales and the wider context in which these locales occur – the cultural and natural landscape. Most significant places are located or positioned in space. Locales are places created and known through common experiences, symbols and meanings. They may be rooms, houses, monuments, meeting-places, camps or settlements. Locales may offer a distinct quality of being inside, or part of, a place. People both live out their lives in place and have a sense of being part of it. Consequently, place is fundamental to the establishment of personal and group identities and the formation of biographies. Place is both 'internal' and 'external' to the human subject, a personally embedded centre of meanings and a physical locus for action. All places thus have metonymic qualities (places and their contents consist of part-whole relations) and differential densities of meanings to their inhabitants according to the events and actions they witness, partake in and remember. A sense of attachment to place is frequently derived from the stability of meanings associated with it.

The naming and identification of particular topographical features, such as sand dunes, bays and inlets, mountain peaks, etc., settlements and sites is crucial for the establishment and maintenance of their identity. Through an act of naming and through the development of human and mythological associations such places become invested with meaning and significance. Place names are of such vital significance because they act so as to transform the sheerly physical and geographical into something that is historically and socially experienced. The bestowing of names creates shared existential space out of a blank environment (Basso 1984: 27; Weiner 1991: 32). By the process of naming places and things they become captured in social discourses and act as mnemonics for the historical actions of individuals and groups. Without a name culturally significant sites would not exist, but only as a raw void, a natural environ-

ment. In a fundamental way names create landscapes. An unnamed place on a map is quite literally a blank space. Names may create places of human import; but they do so in relation to the raw material at hand. For example, the vast majority of Western Apache place-names are lengthy and made up of descriptions of the locations to which they refer, for example *tséká tú yahilíí* (water flows downward on top of a series of flat rocks) or 'coarse-textured rocks lie above in a compact cluster' (Basso 1984: 28, 37). Place-names are used in Apache story-telling as situational or contextualizing devices for locating narrative events in physical settings. The description of the setting is accomplished by the use of the place-name itself (see below).

From the perspective of structuration theory Giddens has emphasized the role of locales in processes of social production and reproduction (Giddens 1979, 1981, 1984). Structure considered as a set of rules and resources for action is the medium through which action is produced, both enabling and constraining it. Structure is also a product of action, and is created, reproduced and changed through the meaningful action of agents. Action affects structure by virtue of its temporal and spatial specificity. Time and space are components of action rather than containers for it. Space plays an important part in defining the manner in which social interaction takes place and the significance it has for agents. Locales are settings in which interaction takes place. 'A setting is not just a spatial parameter, and physical environment, in which interaction occurs: it is these elements mobilized as part of the interaction. Features of the setting of interaction, including its spatial and physical aspects ... are routinely drawn upon by social actors in the sustaining of communication' (Giddens 1979: 206). Spatial contingency and difference in this formulation have clear effects on the manner in which agents interrelate, but this needs to be viewed as a dialectic rather than a causal relationship in order to avoid the pitfalls of a spatial fetishism or an environmental determinism (Saunders 1989; Duncan 1989). Actors *draw* on their settings; and the manner in which they do so depends upon the specificity of their relationship to place. In this manner locales, in the most general sense, can be defined as a presencing of potentialities on which actors draw in the daily conduct of their activities.

Giddens extends the usage of the term locale to include large-scale territorial aggregations such as nation states or empires. It

thus becomes a nested concept on a sliding spatial scale, in which distinctions between locale, locality, region, etc. become blurred. It is far better to confine the usage of the term to the small-scale and the specific. Locales occur in localities, regions or landscapes. Duncan (1989) seriously questions whether there is anything such as locality which can be meaningfully distinguished from the non-local recounting the quip that regional geographers are 'trying to put boundaries that do not exist around regions that do not matter' (Duncan 1989: 238). But he is writing within the context of the development of a theoretical geography of the modern world system. While we might accept that it is virtually impossible to distinguish distinctive spatial parameters of whatever might be defined as 'locality' within contemporary Britain such a conclusion is anachronistic and unhelpful when transferred to the past. A sense of 'placelessness' referred to by Relph (1976) and others in contemporary society is, in essence, to do with the systematic erosion of locality as meaningful. This discussion inevitably brings us to the politics of space.

The Politics of Space

If space is to be regarded as a medium for action, a resource in which actors draw on in their activity and use for their own purposes, it inevitably becomes value-laden rather than value-free and political rather than neutral. At a high level of generality it is possible to distinguish between essential characteristics of Western and capitalist 'spaces' and non-Western and pre-capitalist 'spaces':

infinitely open	different densities
desanctified	sanctified
control	sensuousness
surveillance/partitioning	ritualized/anthropomorphic
economic	cosmological
'useful' to act	'useful' to think
architectural forms resemble each other in 'disciplinary' space	architecture an embodiment of myth and cosmology

landscape as backdrop to action	landscape as sedimented ritual form
time linear and divorced from space	time constitutive of rhythms of social action in space-time
CAPITALIST/WESTERN SPACE	PRE-CAPITALIST/ NON-WESTERN SPACE

The distinctions made above might be considered dominant trends or 'ideal types', in that it is clearly not the case that capitalist or Western spaces are devoid of meanings or significances (see for example the studies in Gold and Burgess 1982; Penning-Rosewell and Lowenthal 1986); and pre-capitalist spaces were, of course, 'useful to act', 'economic' places equally subject to exploitation. However, it remains the case that numerous authors, a massive environmental lobby, and a 'green movement' have consistently remarked on the manner in which landscapes, buildings, places and localities in contemporary society seem to have lost, or be in the process of losing, their value and significance. The space created by market forces must, above all, be a useful and rational place. Once stripped of sedimented human meanings, considered to be purely epiphenomenal and irrelevant, the landscape becomes a surface or volume like any other, open for exploitation and everywhere homogeneous in its potential exchange value for any particular project. It becomes desanctified, set apart from people, myth and history, something to be controlled and used.

Foucault (1986) remarks on the manner in which the work of Galileo and others 'opened out' a medieval space of emplacement in which microcosm mirrored macrocosm, the celestial providing a map for the worldly and vice versa. In the new space thus created the division and 'rational' utilization of space comes increasingly to the fore, and in modern Western 'disciplinary' societies (Foucault 1977) the control and distribution of people in space becomes of central concern. The map becomes a means of inquiry, of examination and control – electoral maps, maps of ethnic groups, taxation maps, etc. Discipline can only be effective through the control and structuring of space; and hence it is not surprising that prisons resemble hospitals, which resemble schools, and factories, which resemble prisons (Foucault 1977: 228).

Relph comments that 'the paradox of modern landscapes is that they are dehumanising because they are excessively humanised. There is almost nothing in them that has not been conceived and planned so that it will serve those human needs which can be assessed in terms of efficiency or improved material conditions. But there is almost nothing in them that can happen spontaneously, autonomously or accidentally, or which expresses human emotions and feelings' (Relph 1981: 104). This opposition between a past of supposed 'spontaneity' and 'freedom' and a present of rational calculation and control seems somewhat overdrawn. If the political qualities of a capitalist landscape relate to a dominant cultural construction of a 'useful', disciplinary space of social control, pre-capitalist spaces are no less invested with forms of power, but within a qualitatively different landscape invested with mythological understandings and ritual knowledges intimately linked with bodily routines and practices.

Landscape and the Scape of Praxis

Spaces and places relationally constitute wider contexts for social practices-landscapes. Anthropologists and archaeologists have been interested for a long time in the relationships between people and the landscape, conceived rather narrowly as 'environmental milieu', but for the most part research has tended to focus on functional and supposedly adaptive parameters of these relationships, with matters such as population levels, resource 'ceilings' and environmental constraints. The vast majority of studies of hunter-fisher-gatherers have tended to concentrate rather narrowly on issues such as the ranges of food resources exploited, food-getting technologies, seasonality and scheduling in relation to settlement size, location and group composition, and degree of mobility. In this approach myths, cosmologies and symbolism are largely deemed irrelevant to what is really going on. What people *think* about the environment has little or no affect on the practical exigencies of having to live in it. On the other hand, there exists a vast body of literature concerned with the analysis of ritual performance and cosmological and social structures in which the environment is equally irrelevant, a mere backdrop to the unconstrained ramifications of the human mind.

A naturalistic view of landscape as a neutral backdrop to activity is clearly of recent origin in thought, an irrelevance in considering pre-capitalist landscapes, and a hindrance in their conceptualization. It is also a highly ideological construct which requires deconstruction even in the context of capitalist landscapes. A culturalist view of landscape as a highly specific, symbolic and cognitive ordering of space offers far more potential in understanding but, as Ingold argues (Ingold 1992, 1993), encloses humanity into a series of separate cultural worlds constituted as structured sets of shared representations divorced from 'nature' or the physical world. This external world provides a source of raw sense data, without order or meaning and, in perception, these data become 'detached (as "stimuli") from the environment and attached (as "sensations") to human subjects' (Ingold 1992: 51). They are then ordered into cultural schemata. The line of argument taken here is akin to parts of that recently advanced by Ingold, which he terms a 'dwelling perspective'. People and environment are constitutive components of the *same* world, which it is unhelpful to think of in terms of a binary nature/culture distinction. In the perception of the world and in the consumption of resources (utilitarian or symbolic) from that world meanings embodied in environmental objects are drawn into the experiences of subjects. Perception of the world and the constitution of that which is important or unimportant to people does not work in terms of a 'blank environmental slate' on which perception and cognition sets to work, but in terms of the historicity of lived experiences in that world. The landscape is an anonymous sculptural form always already fashioned by human agency, never completed, and constantly being added to, and the relationship between people and it is a constant dialectic and process of structuration: the landscape is both medium *for* and outcome *of* action and previous histories of action. Landscapes are experienced in practice, in life activities.

Ingold argues that 'the cultural construction of the environment is not so much a *prelude* to practical action as an (optional) epilogue' and 'culture is a framework not for *perceiving* the world, but for *interpreting* it, to oneself and others' (Ingold 1992: 52-3). It seems unhelpful to polarize, as Ingold appears to do, perception and interpretation, practical activity and the cultural work of explication and discourse. To ask: 'Which comes first: practical activity or cultural knowledge?' is to set up artificial barriers

between practical activities and discursive levels of consciousness that go to constitute each other, neither of which is amenable to prioritization. The cultural construction of the environment is both 'prelude' and 'epilogue', and it does not necessarily involve 'explication' or 'discourse', as Ingold assumes.

Features of the natural landscape may be held to have provided a symbolic resource of the utmost significance to prehistoric populations. A number of ethnographies of small-scale societies, discussed in Chapter 2, of both hunter-gatherers and subsistence cultivators, indicate that rather than simply providing a backdrop for human action the natural landscape is a cognized form redolent with place names, associations and memories that serve to humanize and enculture landscape, linking together topographical features, trees, rocks, rivers, birds and animals with patterns of human intentionality. Significant locations become crystallized out of the environment through the production and recognition of meanings in particular places and through events that have taken place. Humanized places become fashioned out of the landscape through the recognition of significant qualities in that which has not in itself been culturally produced (rocks, rivers, trees, etc.) by association with current use, past social actions or actions of a mythological character.

It is important not to forget that the contemporary term 'landscape' is highly ideological. Cosgrove and Daniels define landscape as 'a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings' (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988: 1). Such an image may be structured on canvas, in writing and on the ground through earth, stone and vegetation. Landscapes, in this rather limited definition, are images which are created and read, verbal or non-verbal texts. Raymond Williams (1973: 120) notes that the very idea of landscape implies separation and observation. A concern with landscape is one of patrician control manifested in landscape painting, writing, gardening and architecture. Cosgrove (1984) locates the origins of the idea of landscape in early capitalist Italian Renaissance city states: the city gives birth simultaneously to capitalism and landscape. Landscape is a particular way of seeing, the linear techniques of perspective developed in landscape painting at this time to create a 'realistic' image parallel the development of practices such as cartography, astronomy, land surveying and mapping involving formal geometrical rules. The whole notion of

landscape, Cosgrove argues, propagates a visual ideology masking the social forces and relations of production, relations of exploitation and alienation.

Yet in a seemingly contradictory fashion Cosgrove also extols the virtues of landscape as concept and image:

landscape is a uniquely valuable concept for a humane geography. Unlike *place* it reminds us of our position in the scheme of nature. Unlike *environment* or *space* it reminds us that only through human consciousness and reason is that scheme known to us, and only through technique can we participate as humans in it. At the same time landscape reminds us that geography *is* everywhere, that it is a constant source of beauty and ugliness, of right and wrong and joy and suffering, as much as it is of profit and loss' (Cosgrove 1989: 122).

Daniels (1989), discussing the work of Williams and Berger in relation to landscape and its representation through artworks, brings out a similar tension in their relation to the concept. Representations of landscape have the potential to both obscure and articulate lived experience. In other words landscape as image has both ideological and ontological implications for the way in which we think about the world. Daniels rightly concludes that 'we should beware of attempts to define landscape, to resolve its contradictions; rather we should abide in its duplicity' (Daniels 1989: 218).

It is the ontological connotations of landscape stressed by Cosgrove, in the passage cited above, that make it important to retain the term, to abide in the duplicity of using it at all. As should be clear from the preceding discussions, I reject a notion of landscape as inhering solely in the form of mental representation and cognition. By 'landscape' I want instead to refer to the physical and visual form of the earth as an environment and as a setting in which locales occur and in dialectical relation to which meanings are created, reproduced and transformed. The *appearance* of a landscape is something that is substantial and capable of being described in terms of relief, topography, the flows of contours and rivers, coasts, rocks and soils, and so on. It is most usually clearly defined features, such as mountain peaks, ridges, bogs and plains, that occur in geographical descriptions. The locales in a landscape may be natural features such as bays or inlets on a coastline or high points, or humanly created places such as monuments or settlements. Humanly created locales, I

want to argue in this book, draw on *qualities* of landscape to create part of their significance for those who use them, and the perception of the landscape itself may be fundamentally affected by the very situatedness of these locales. A fundamental part of daily experience in non-industrial societies is the physical and biological experience of landscape – earth, water, wood, stone, high places and low places, the wind, rain, sun, stars and sky. The rhythms of the land and the seasons correspond to and are worked into the rhythms of life. A landscape has ontological import because it is lived in and through, mediated, worked on and altered, replete with cultural meaning and symbolism – and not just something looked at or thought about, an object merely for contemplation, depiction, representation and aestheticization.

Powers of Place

Precisely because locales and their landscapes are drawn on in the day-to-day lives and encounters of individuals they possess powers. The spirit of a place may be held to reside in a landscape. Familiarity with the land, being able to read and decode its signs allows individuals to know 'how to go on' at a practical level of consciousness or one that may be discursively formulated. People routinely draw on their stocks of knowledge of the landscape and the locales in which they act to give meaning, assurance and significance to their lives. The place acts dialectically so as to create the people who are of that place. These qualities of locales and landscapes give rise to a feeling of belonging and rootedness and a familiarity, which is not born just out of knowledge, but of *concern* that provides ontological security. They give rise to a power to act and a power to relate that is both liberating and productive.

The relationship of individuals and groups to locales and landscape also has important *perspectival* effects. The experience of these places is unlikely to be equally shared and experienced by all, and the understanding and use of them can be controlled and exploited in systems of domination – a consideration strikingly absent in virtually all phenomenological theory and one that constitutes a major theoretical void. In small-scale societies the major axes of spatial domination are usually organized along the axes of age, gender, kin, and lineage. Knowledge and experience of

particular locales and tracts of the landscape may be restricted and hidden from particular individuals and groups. The powers of spatial experience are clearly related to the manner in which they are realized, to whom, when and how. Features of the settings of social interaction may constitute 'disciplinary' spaces through which knowledge is controlled or acquired in a highly structured manner. The ability to control access to and manipulate particular settings for action is a fundamental feature of the operation of power as domination.

Time, Memory and Movement

Human activities become inscribed within a landscape such that every cliff, large tree, stream, swampy area becomes a familiar place. Daily passages through the landscape become biographic encounters for individuals, recalling traces of past activities and previous events and the reading of signs – a split log here, a marker stone there.

All locales and landscapes are therefore embedded in the social and individual times of memory. Their pasts as much as their spaces are crucially constitutive of their presents. Neither space nor time can be understood apart from social practices which serve to bind them together. The human experience of encountering a new place or knowing how to act or go on in a familiar place is intimately bound up with previous experiences. Places are always 'read' or understood in relation to others. While places and movement between them are intimately related to the formation of personal biographies, places themselves may be said to acquire a history, sedimented layers of meaning by virtue of the actions and events that take place in them. Personal biographies, social identities and a biography of place are intimately connected. Memories of previous moves in a landscape are as essential to understanding as they are in playing a game of chess. Remembrance is a process solidified from things and spatial encounters. Movement in the world always involves a loss of place, but the gaining of a fragment of time. It sets up a series of expectations for the paths of the future. Memories continually provide modifications to a sense of place which can never be exactly the same place twice, although there may be ideological attempts to provide 'stability' or perceptual and cognitive fixity

to a place, to reproduce sets of dominant meanings, understandings, representations and images.

There is an art of moving in the landscape, a right way (socially constrained) to move around in it and approach places and monuments. Part of the sense of place is the action of approaching it from the 'right' (socially prescribed) direction. To mention just one example here, the Gabbra camel herders of the Kenyan–Ethiopian borderlands undertake ritual pilgrimages and perform periodic rituals at holy mountain sites surrounded by plains. These *jila* journeys are a return to the origin sites of individual Gabbra lineages. The journeys establish spatial linkages between different mountains or mountain peaks and given lineages. Through the journey the lineage becomes 'mapped' in the terrain. The shortest route to a ritual mountain from any point on the plain is not taken but rather a prescribed walk in which it can be approached and seen from the propitious direction (Schlee 1992).

A walk is always a combination of places and times- seasonal and social times. De Certeau (1984: Part III) has described an art of walking which is simultaneously an art of thinking and an art of practice or operating in the world. Movement through space constructs 'spatial stories', forms of narrative understanding. This involves a continuous presencing of previous experiences in present contexts. Spatial knowledge requires the coupling of an accumulated time of memory to overcome an initially hostile and alienating encounter with a new place. Flashes of memory, so to speak, illuminate the occasion.

Pedestrian 'speech acts' may be likened to the speech acts of language. Walking is a process of appropriation of the topographical system, as speaking is an appropriation of language. It is a spatial acting out of place, as the speech act is an acoustic acting out of language. Walking, like language use, implies relationality in terms of an overall system of differences. It is a movement with reference to a differentiated series of locales, just as language is constituted as a system of differences between signs – 'dog' is dog because it is not cat, and so on (de Certeau 1984: 98).

A spatial order of walking can be characterized in terms of an order of possibilities – various ways in which an actor can move, and a series of restrictions, for example walls or other boundaries inhibiting passage. A walker actualizes only some of the possibilities, which may be relatively open or closed in terms of the over-

all 'grammatical' system. These possibilities remain only as potentialities in so far as they only exist in the act of their realization through movement in the world. Through movement parts of the system – places or paths – are ignored, condemned to inertia, while others are activated through use or presence. De Certeau goes further than this to refer to a 'rhetoric' and 'tropes' of walking, which can be likened to turns of phrase. An art of 'turning phrases' provides an analogy for an individual's following or diverging from paths, both of them constituting ways of being, thinking and operating in the world. Synecdoche is an art of speaking in which a part stands for a whole (sail for ship, tree for forest, monument for landscape). In walking a street may substitute for a community, a path for a network of paths. The part is expanded into something more, a totality. Asyndeton, an art of speaking involving the suppression of linking words such as conjunctions between or within sentences, finds a spatial expression in the cutting out of places. Synecdoche then creates spatial densities; asyndeton undermines or cuts through continuities.

A space treated in this way and shaped by practices is transformed into enlarged singularities and separate islands. Through these swellings, shrinkages, and fragmentations, that is through these rhetorical operations a spatial phrasing of an analogical (composed of juxtaposed citations) and elliptical (made of gaps, lapses and allusions) type is created. For the technological system of a coherent and totalizing space that is 'linked' and simultaneous, the figures of pedestrian rhetoric substitute trajectories ... [which are a] stylistic metamorphosis of space (de Certeau 1984: 101–2).

The important aspect of this argument is its revelation of an art of walking as simultaneously an art of consciousness, habit and practice, that is both constrained by place and landscape and constitutive of them. Walking is the medium and outcome of a spatial practice, a mode of existence in the world. The analogy can be taken further in the consideration of paths.

Paths, Inscriptions, Temporality

If writing solidifies or objectifies speech into a material medium, a text, which can be read and interpreted, an analogy can be drawn between a pedestrian speech act and its inscription or

writing on the ground in the form of the path or track. Both are sedimented traces of activity, and both provide ways to be followed. A strong path is inscribed through a forest or across a tract of heathland through a multitude of pedestrian speech acts that keep it open; a strong text is also one that is kept open, read many times. Just as the writing of a text is dependent on previous texts (it has the characteristic of intertextuality), the creation or maintenance of a path is dependent on a previous networking of movements in particular, and reiterated directions through a landscape; it works in relation to a previous set of precedents.

The metaphor of the path is a common one in many small-scale societies, and refers beyond itself to patterns of activity and social organization. A path may be a way of doing something as method, technique, pattern or strategy. In Oceania and Indonesia fishing techniques, oratorical skills, patterns of exchange and strategies of warfare are also termed 'paths'. Paths are also fundamentally to do with establishing and maintaining social linkages and relations between individuals, groups and political units. Social paths and the paths followed through the forest may become overgrown through lack of use in any particular (physical or social) direction.

Parmentier (1987: 109–11) notes three general features of the semantic fields of paths on the island of *Belau* derived from reflections on movements made along them. First, points linked by a clear path have achieved a degree of structural homology and hence positive cultural identity. The points linked by paths share sets of common elements – sacred stones, trees, artefact depositions, names and titles referred to in myths and stories and linked to the activities of ancestors who stopped on the journey which created the path. Second, linked places on paths can be understood in terms of sequential precedence, a hierarchy of ancestral origin points from which paths radiate to others. Priority in time is linked to the ceremonial precedence and power of places linked by paths. Third, paths structure experiences of the places they link, they help to establish a sense of linear order. A path brings forth possibilities for repeated actions within prescribed confines. Only a high-ranking or wealthy person is likely to be daring enough to invent a path or plant a relationship not established before. Such action is most usually the domain of the

gods or heroic ancestors. Expert knowledge of ancient paths is part of the responsibility of chiefs who can harness great power by narrating stories recounting previous patterns of ancestral movements (*ibid.*: 114–15).

A journey along a path can be claimed to be a paradigmatic cultural act, since it is following in the steps inscribed by others whose steps have worn a conduit for movement which becomes the correct or 'best way to go'. Spatiotemporal linkages thus established become obvious templates for future movements and the maintenance of relationships. Linked places along the journey may be read in terms of temporal relationships of precedence and power. There is usually a good reason for following in a particular direction linking places in a serial trajectory, and the more people who have shared in the purpose of the path the more important it becomes. Paths form an essential medium for the routing of social relations, connecting up spatial impressions with temporally inscribed memories.

Spatial Stories, Landscape and the Arts of Narrative

In movement on a path through the landscape something is constantly slipping away and something is constantly gained in a relational tactile world of impressions, signs, sights, smells and physical sensations. To understand a landscape truly it must be felt, but to convey some of this feeling to others it has to be talked about, recounted, or written and depicted. In the process of movement a landscape unfolds or unravels before an observer. Beyond one chain of hills another is revealed; the view from a locale makes sense of its positioning. The importance and significance of a place can only be appreciated as part of movement from and to it in relation to others, and the act of moving may be as important as that of arriving. The path may be a symbol not only of interconnectedness and social relations but of movement through life. If places are read and experienced in relation to others and through serial movement along the axes of paths it follows that an art of understanding of place, movement and landscape must fundamentally be a narrative understanding involving a presencing of previous experiences in present contexts. Spatial and textual stories are embedded in one another.

Narrative structure and emplotment can easily be claimed to have ontological significance for human existence, to be as universal as language itself. It is precisely because narrative is seemingly so 'natural' a part of human existence that it is both an important resource for analysis and understanding and something whose non-critical use as *merely* description is something to be wary of. A critical understanding of spatial narrative requires that we investigate precisely why we prefer some plots or configurations of things rather than others. In other words attention must be played to the manner in which the story is creatively orchestrated, how it guides, and what it passes through.

Narrative is a means of understanding and describing the world in relation to agency. It is a means of linking locales, landscapes, actions, events and experiences together providing a synthesis of heterogeneous phenomena. In its simplest form it involves a story and a story-teller. In its mimetic or phenomenological form narrative seeks to capture action not just through description but as a form of re-description. Events are given meaning through their configuration into a whole, requiring the emplotment of action. A narrative must of necessity always be written from a certain point of view. In relation to the past and written from the standpoint of the present, narrative structures play a similar role to metaphor – they describe the world in fresh ways, bringing new meanings and new senses, and the productivity is, in principle, endless. Ricoeur (1983) rightly emphasizes the poetic qualities of narratives in producing configurations of events and objects that go far beyond a simple matter of succession, i.e. this occurs after or because of that.

De Certeau (1984) points out that every story not only involves some kind of temporal movement, but is also a spatial practice. Stories organize walks, making a journey as the feet perform it, organizing places by means of the displacements that are described. They are part of a human labour that transforms an abstract homogeneous space into place – 'you go round the corner, turn left and you'll see...'. In other words the story is a discursive articulation of a spatializing practice, a bodily itinerary and routine. Spatial stories are about the operations and practices which constitute places and locales. The map, by contrast, involves a stripping away of these things: 'it alone remains on the stage. The tour describers have disappeared' (de Certeau 1984:

121). If stories are linked with regularly repeated spatial practices they become mutually supportive, and when a story becomes sedimented into the landscape, the story and the place dialectically help to construct and reproduce each other. Places help to recall stories that are associated with them, and places only exist (as named locales) by virtue of their emplotment in a narrative. Places, like persons, have biographies inasmuch as they are formed, used and transformed in relation to practice. It can be argued that stories acquire part of their mythic value and historical relevance if they are rooted in the concrete details of locales in the landscape, acquiring material reference points that can be visited, seen and touched.

If naming is an act of construction of landscape, constituting an origin point for it, then narratives introduce temporality, making locales markers of individual and group experiences. Basso (1984), in an excellent paper, demonstrates how individual Apaches experience oral narratives: 'the land is always stalking people. The land makes people live right' (Annie Peaches, cited in Basso 1984: 21). Narratives establish bonds between people and features of the landscape such as mountains, creating moral guidance for activity. Both land and language are equally symbolic resources drawn on to foster correct social behaviour and values. In narratives geographical features of the landscape act as mnemonic pegs on which moral teachings hang. The landscape is full of named locations that act so as to fuse time and space. Through the use of historical tales events are located at named points, and the tales themselves are about correct codes of moral conduct. 'Shooting someone with a story' is relating a historical tale about misconduct that reflects back on their misdemeanours, a tale that becomes anchored in space through specifying a named geographical location where the event took place. Stories are intimately connected with physical places on the land, fused with geological elements: 'you cannot *live* in that land without asking or looking at or noticing a boulder or rock. And there's always a story' (Silko 1981: 69, cited in Basso 1984). Features of the landscape become deeply symbolic of cultural lifeworlds, omnipresent moral forces rather than mere physical presences (Basso 1984: 46). Through narratives conceptions of the land affect the way in which the Apache think of themselves and vice versa.

Conclusion

A landscape is a series of named locales, a set of relational places linked by paths, movements and narratives. It is a 'natural' topography perspectively linked to the existential Being of the body in societal space. It is a cultural code for living, an anonymous 'text' to be read and interpreted, a writing pad for inscription, a scape of and for human praxis, a mode of dwelling and a mode of experiencing. It is invested with powers, capable of being organized and choreographed in relation to sectional interests, and is always sedimented with human significances. It is story and telling, temporality and remembrance. Landscape is a signifying system through which the social is reproduced and transformed, explored and structured – process organized. Landscape, above all, represents a means of conceptual ordering that stresses relations. The concept emphasizes a conventional means of doing so, the stress is on similarity to control the undermining nature of difference, of multivocal code, found in the concepts of place or locale. A concept of place privileges difference and singularity; a concept of landscape is more holistic, acting so as to encompass rather than exclude. It is to a discussion of various ways in which landscapes may be organized that the next chapter turns.

Chapter 2

The Social Construction of Landscape in Small-Scale Societies: Structures of Meaning, Structures of Power

Introduction

In this chapter I want to discuss relationships established between people and the landscape in small-scale 'traditional' societies, reviewing some of the discussions in the ethnographic literature relating to hunter–fisher–gatherers and subsistence cultivators. The aim is to underline the affective, emotional and symbolic significance of the landscape and highlight some of the similarities and differences in the relationship between people and the land, and the manner in which it is culturally constructed, invested with powers and significances, and appropriated in widely varying 'natural' environments and social settings.

A caveat is in order: in general terms the anthropological literature, in contrast with that of human geography, is not exactly replete with discussions of the significance of landscape. It is rare to even find an entry in an index referring to 'landscape', or use of the term in a book, article or chapter title. Landscape has remained a neglected area of study, and detailed accounts are few and far between. Two books, currently in press as I write, are exceptions which prove the rule (Bender 1993; Hirsch and O'Hanlon, in press). One, I think erroneous, conclusion that might be drawn from this is that the landscape simply does not matter, or the category is irrelevant to understanding the manner in which populations in small-scale societies interact with, understand and relate to their physical surroundings.

However, a great number of texts do make mention of the significance of the land. For example, Barth in his introduction to a monograph on the Baktaman of Papua New Guinea notes that 'Baktaman are highly oriented towards *space* in ordering their